Lights out : three years after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, questions are mounting about unintended consequences for hundreds of U.S. firms by Doug Campbell
O
n March 17, shares in discount
men’s clothier S&K Famous
Brands fell 8.6 percent.
Executives at the Richmond-based
firm were hardly surprised. In fact,
Chief Financial Officer Robert
Knowles had thought the dive might
be steeper.
The day before, S&K had
announced that it was terminating its
registration under the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934. In market slang,
S&K was “going dark.” No longer
would the company file quarterly and
annual reports on its financial condi-
tion, and so no longer was the ticker
symbol SKFB welcome on the Nasdaq
National Market. S&K shares would
instead trade on the Pink Sheets, land
of the penny stocks, where Securities
and Exchange Commission noncom-
pliance is no barrier to membership.
S&K officers said they wouldn’t have
done it if not for the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002. Apress release summed it
up this way: “The increasing financial
cost and commitment of manage-
ment’s time to regulatory compliance
have become a burden that will only
increase over time.”
Knowles estimates his firm can
save $300,000 a year by sidestepping
just a single component of Sarbanes-
Oxley, Section 404, which requires a
detailed, independent review of a
company’s internal financial reporting
controls — plus a signed declaration
from top executives and auditors that
those controls actually work. For
S&K, such a review is a budget-buster. 
Among other things, compliance
would mean documenting how a large
sample of S&K’s 240 stores in 27
states report each and every transac-
tion — that is, everything from the
sale of a $20 necktie to the return of a
$500 suit, how they are keyed in, and
how they are stored in the warehouse.
These are already well-documented
procedures at S&K, but reporting
under the new rules would bring
about, for one thing, the hiring of a
second auditor to conduct its own
review of S&K’s internal operations.
Knowles frowns in explaining it all.
“It’s not a necessary procedure for us,”
he says. “The shareholder isn’t going
to get anything more out of Section
404 — other than the fact that we
spent $300,000.”
S&K’s management is far from
alone in this sentiment. Corporate
America has a new scourge: Sarbanes-
Oxley. High-profile critics include the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the
Wall Street Journal editorial page.
Three years after the 





hundreds of U.S. firms
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Squeezable lightbulbs with the Enron logo
were just one of a warehouse full of items
auctioned off after the company’s demise
in 2001.
lights lightsout


































RF Summer 2005 FINAL.ps - 7/12/2005 13:52 PM14 Region Focus • Summer 2005
Citing the new rules, a growing num-
ber of firms since 2002 have either
stopped making filings with the SEC
or gone private. (Unlike “dark” firms,
companies that go private stop trad-
ing to public investors and usually, but 
not always, repurchase all of their 
outstanding stock.) This was not
exactly what lawmakers had in mind
as a remedy to corporate scandals like
Enron and WorldCom.
A new crop of studies lends some
support to the claim that Sarbanes-
Oxley may be having the unintended
effect of driving firms, especially
small ones, from the SEC’s watch.
These findings are in keeping with
standard economic theory that exces-
sive regulation is bad for business —
and the wider economy as well.
A broad spectrum of analysts and
observers agree that portions of
Sarbanes-Oxley — chiefly, the notori-
ous Section 404 of the act — provide
few direct benefits to investors and
even fewer to the companies trying 
to implement them. Even after
Sarbanes-Oxley, internal controls 
were responsible for detecting fewer
financial frauds than those detected 
by tips, internal audits, and “by acci-
dent,” according to a 2004 survey 
by the Association of Certified Fraud
Examiners. Meanwhile, critics say
Sarbanes-Oxley amounts to a gift to
the accounting industry, requiring as 
it does extra auditors and accountants.
But a closer look at the studies and
the firms going private or dark is 
revealing. First of all, this involves only
a tiny fraction of companies that trade
in the U.S. public markets. Despite all
the chest-pounding over rising compli-
ance costs, a large majority of the
approximately 17,000 publicly traded
U.S. firms remain under the auspices of
the SEC. What’s more, for many, get-
ting out of the SEC’s view might have
been a prudent move even without
Sarbanes-Oxley. These are generally
small firms that were already on the
public-private margin — and that may
even go for S&KFamous Brands.
Conflicting evidence like this
makes it difficult to assess the effects
of Sarbanes-Oxley, especially on small
firms. It is entirely plausible that
many large corporate frauds have
been prevented because of Sarbanes-
Oxley. Such deterrence would have a
significant and positive impact on the
economy. The problem is that it is
very hard to measure this possibility.
Three years, it seems, has not been
enough time to figure out whether
Sarbanes-Oxley went too far.
In the Wake of the Crash
Sarbanes-Oxley took effect under the
banner “Public Accounting Reform 
and Investor Protection Act” when
President Bush signed it into law on 
July 30, 2002. It was universally regarded
as the most substantial overhaul of 
U.S. business regulations since the 
enactment of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, which created the SEC 
as the centerpiece of an effort to pre-
vent a repeat of the 1929 market crash.
With the go-go 1990s a fond 
memory, politicians responded to 
public clamoring for a corporate
crackdown, something to dissuade
future Enrons from happening. They
produced a set of rules whose main
provisions aimed to hold CEOs and
CFOs more accountable for their
firms’ financial disclosures, required
more thorough reporting programs,
and established stricter standards for
membership on board audit commit-
tees. There also was the creation of a
new oversight board to monitor the
accounting industry. Underlining all of
it were hefty doses of new criminal
penalties — fines of $5 million and 
20 years in prison for executives who
knowingly certify false financial
reports. (Richard Scrushy, the first
CEO to be prosecuted under
Sarbanes-Oxley, was acquitted June 28
after three weeks of deliberation.)
The reforms came at a time when
the country was coming out of re-
cession and less than a year removed
from the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11,
2001. At the same time, stock ex-
changes were toughening their rules
for listing, civil lawsuits were mount-
ing, and the criminal justice system
was stepping up, as perp walks featur-
ing former Wall Street darlings
became commonplace.
To some economists, Sarbanes-
Oxley was an unnecessary pile-on.
Disclosure is often in the best inter-
ests of businesses, since firms that
fully disclose their information may
command higher share prices for their
stock. Disclosure, many academics
agree, potentially reduces the age-old
agency problem inherent in large
organizations whose owners are not
necessarily the same as their man-
agers. In this way, shareholders are
better equipped to keep an eye on
managers, making sure they are doing
what they were hired to do: increase
the firm’s share value. 
Disclosure also takes the edge off
of adverse selection in capital markets
— if all investors are equally and well-
To protect investors by improving the accuracy and relia-
bility of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the
securities laws, and for other purposes. 
(a) RULES REQUIRED. The Commission shall prescribe
rules requiring each annual report required by section
13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15
U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) to contain an internal control
report, which shall
(1) state the responsibility of management for establish-
ing and maintaining an adequate internal control structure
and procedures for financial reporting; and
(2) contain an assessment, as of the end of the most
recent fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the
internal control structure and procedures of the issuer 
for financial reporting.
(b) INTERNAL CONTROL EVALUATION AND REPORTING.
With respect to the internal control assessment required
by subsection (a), each registered public accounting firm
that prepares or issues the audit report for the issuer shall
attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the
management of the issuer. An attestation made under
this subsection shall be made in accordance with stan-
dards for attestation engagements issued or adopted by
the Board. Any such attestation shall not be the subject
of a separate engagement.
SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002
SEC. 404. MANAGEMENT ASSESSMENT OF 
INTERNAL CONTROLS.
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firms that ought to be avoided. But in
Sarbanes-Oxley, the government was
essentially saying that new measures
were necessary to reel in agency costs.
Whether Sarbanes-Oxley has actu-
ally succeeded in easing the agency
problem remains up for grabs.
Disclosure does not automatically rid
the world of fraud. Companies could
meet all of the law’s disclosure require-
ments but still file fraudulent reports.
In addition, an economically rational
world seeks to “keep on spending on
fraud prevention until the returns on a
dollar invested in prevention are no
more than a dollar,” says William
Carney, a law professor at Emory
University who is studying the costs of
being public after Sarbanes-Oxley. In
other words, wiping out all fraud would
be prohibitively expensive. You don’t
want it to cost more to prevent fraud
than the fraud itself would have cost in
the first place. Better, Carney says, is to
strive for an “optimal amount of fraud.”
And he is very skeptical that Sarbanes-
Oxley has brought us anywhere closer
to achieving optimization. Sarbanes-
Oxley, Carney writes, “may have
reached the point where the costs of
regulation clearly exceed its benefits for
many corporations.”
Numerous surveys have tried to
nail down the new costs of complying
with Sarbanes-Oxley. Foley & Lardner,
a Chicago law firm, found in 2003 and
2004 that the average cost of being
public for firms with annual revenues
less than $1 billion grew $1.6 million,
or 130 percent, since Sarbanes-Oxley
took effect. In a different survey of
larger firms, Financial Executives
International reported that Section
404 compliance clocked in at an aver-
age $4.36 million per firm, which was
39 percent higher than surveyed firms
had originally expected to pay.
If rising costs persuade large num-
bers of firms to exit the public markets
to evade SEC regulation, two distinct
problems are created. First, the overall
economy might suffer insofar as firms
may give up investment projects
because they may have to rely on high-
er-cost sources of capital to fund
operations. Second, firms that “go
dark” may happen to be the very sort of
financially stressed organizations
which shareholders might want closer
tabs on — the very sort of companies
Sarbanes-Oxley was designed to police.
(A counter argument is that a
“dark” Enron would never have been
able to raise as much capital as it did;
in this way, the trend of troubled
firms going dark may not be such a
bad thing because shareholders
wouldn’t be funding the new capital
by buying up stock.) 
Going dark is probably the 
most extreme reaction to climbing
compliance costs. Among the main 
requirements for being able to 
deregister is having fewer than 300
(sometimes 500) shareholders of
record. It can be a quick process. When
S&K delisted, for example, it needed
only to provide written notice to
Nasdaq of its intent to delist and 
then file a Form 15 with the SEC. With
that, all obligations to operate under
the auspices of the SEC ceased and
S&K — or any other deregistering
organization — could join the Pink
Sheets, an automated quotation service
known informally as an over-the-count-
er bulletin board. This is the land of
no-name stocks, firms which are
longest-shot candidates to grace the
covers of Fortune and Forbes. Inevitably,
firms that go dark see their stock prices
fall, a function of both the Pink Sheets’
looser listing requirements and the rela-
tive lack of liquidity compared with the
Nasdaq or New York Stock Exchange.
People started to notice a spike in
“going dark” maneuvers shortly after
Sarbanes-Oxley went into effect. In the
summer of 2003, some institutional
investors filed a petition arguing that
many firms going dark were unfairly
taking advantage of the 300-share-
holder rule. It was alleged that many of
these firms actually had thousands of
shareholders, but because their stock
was held by a relatively small number of
brokerages and other institutions, the
delisting firms could point to less than
300 holders of record. Three business
school researchers took notice of the
petition and decided to investigate 
further. “In the back of our minds was
that maybe Sarbanes-Oxley was
responsible for this,” says Alexander
Triantis, a University of Maryland busi-
ness professor and co-author of  the
paper “Why Do Firms Go Dark?”
Just as they suspected, the authors
found that the number of firms that
went dark surged sharply after the
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley: from 43
in 2001, to 67 in 2002, and then way up
to 198 in 2003 (see table). Because figur-
ing out who’s going dark requires
combing through SEC filings, 2004
numbers were still being tallied this
spring, but the researchers estimate that
134 companies delisted in 2004, still far
above the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley pace.
An examination of going-dark 
filings among firms with headquarters
in the Fifth District is inconclusive,
mainly because of the small sample
size.  In 2001, six Fifth District firms
filed to go dark; in 2002 it was down
to four but in 2003 the number
jumped to 10. The pace slowed to six
going-dark filings in 2004. In a fairly
typical announcement just before its
2003 deregistration, Maryland-based
International Dispensing Corp. said it
expected to save up to $190,000 a
year: “The company believes that 
the cost savings of terminating
reporting obligations far outweigh the
benefits of maintaining the company’s
status as a Securities and Exchange
Commission reporting company.”
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The SOXSpike
Two studies have attributed an increase in the 
number of firms going dark and going private to 
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delisting trend as “consistent with a
Sarbanes-Oxley effect but not com-
pletely conclusive.” Firms may be
going dark for completely sensible,
above-board reasons — that is, the
benefits of SEC listing are now
swamped by the costs due to Sarbanes-
Oxley. Most firms that go dark are
described in their paper as distressed
and small. By delisting, even factoring
in the usual 10 percent stock price dip,
firms are making an economically
rational choice that may benefit share-
holders over the long term.
The more negative interpretation
has it that the firms’ managers are
thinking more about their own inter-
ests than that of other shareholders.
They want to protect themselves
from liability, and to continue using
their companies as their own private
piggy banks, keeping their jobs and
increasing their compensation. 
“We think Sarbanes-Oxley definite-
ly has to be driving some of this,”
Triantis says. “Whether that’s simply
due to the cost of Section 404 that all
these firms are complaining about or
whether it’s the increased scrutiny and
liability that managers want to avoid —
that’s a little harder to determine.”
From High Flyer to Low Profile
S&K is a virtual case study of the
going-dark decision. Here is a compa-
ny with an almost mythical-sounding
beginning. As told on the S&K Web
site, the company opened in 1967
when founder Hip Siegel loaded up his 
station wagon with discounted suits
from department stores, then resold
them at a profit. The operation grew
to 10 stores by 1983, the year it first
offered shares to the public. With the
money raised, S&K immediately 
doubled in size and kept a consistent
growth pattern through the early 21st
century, today peaking at 240 stores.
Stuart Siegel, Hip’s son, soon took
over as chairman. He is a well-known
figure in Richmond, a philanthropist
whose home was recently featured in
the local newspaper. Only four years
ago S&K cracked Forbes’ list of “200
Best Small Companies,” landing at
exactly No. 200. At the time, despite
the business-casual trend of dress, it
was coming off five years of strong
profit and sales growth. Then in early
2004, it retired almost all of its debt,
making for a healthy balance sheet.
But for all the growth, the market
was no longer rewarding S&K as
before. S&K’s book value — essential-
ly, what it would be worth if it sold off
all its assets — was $20 a share, higher
by several dollars than the typical trad-
ing price in 2003 and 2004. Two years
ago, the last two analysts covering
S&K stock dropped their coverage,
leaving investors with fewer options
for independent scrutiny of the com-
pany’s earnings prospects. Trades of
S&K stock grew rarer and rarer, mak-
ing it more difficult for owners to sell
at a profit. With a market capitaliza-
tion of less than $50 million, S&Kwas
known as a small-cap stock, barely a
blip on Wall Street’s radar screen. 
Then came Sarbanes-Oxley. At
first, S&K’s Knowles was optimistic.
He thought firms like S&K, with no
history of governance problems and
decent growth prospects, would see
their stock prices climb along with a
boost in investor confidence. His
mood turned sour when the implica-
tions of Section 404 became clear. 
S&Kwas caught in the unfortunate
position of being both small in terms
of financial resources but big in terms
of the breadth of work needed to com-
ply with Sarbanes-Oxley. Section 404
mandates a thorough, independent
review of a firm’s internal financial
reporting practices. For S&K, the
manpower and the costs involved in
compliance were overwhelming. “We
have cookie-cutter stores, 240 differ-
ent sites, over 1 million square feet in
27 states,” Knowles says. “Yet we
would have to document all that from
a representative sample of all those
stores and have people who don’t
know menswear from a tree go in
there and try to document and then
audit it. And what benefit can possibly
come from that?”
Knowles adds with exasperation,
“It’s like putting on three or four extra
seatbelts.”
S&K opted to remove those per-
ceived extra seatbelts. The choice
prompted the aforementioned stock
drop, but has had little other negative
impact, Knowles says. The Pink
Sheets provide an adequate trading
ground for S&K stock. And S&K
will continue posting its financial
results on its Web site, still have
everything audited, and look to con-
tinue its growth strategy and reward
shareholders. The only difference,
Knowles insists, is that S&K won’t be
following Section 404. “The job is
basically the same,” he says, referring
to his post as chief financial officer.
Meanwhile, S&K’s stock was trading
about $17 a share going into the sum-
mer, close to its pre-Pink Sheets price.
All things considered, not bad for a
dark company.
ALittle Privacy
Going dark is not to be confused with
going private. A“dark” firm still trades
among outside investors. A firm that
goes private keeps its stock closely
held. A public company can become
private in several ways, with the most
common methods being a merger
with a shell company, a tender offer to
purchase shares from other stock-
holders, or a reverse stock split that
reduces the number of shareholders
of record to less than 300. In general,
it’s a bit harder to go private than
dark, and sometimes requires a lot
more money.
A growing literature posits that
many small and midsize firms ought 
to consider abandoning the public 
markets. Skyrocketing compliance
costs are only one part of the puzzle.
These days, smaller public firms 
experience serious liquidity issues
anyway, trading with nothing like the
regularity and smoothness of S&P
500 firms. This reduces the presumed
advantage public companies have in
selling stock quickly and easily. 
Besides ditching the costly trap-
pings of Sarbanes-Oxley, private
companies get to keep more of their
financial information out of reach
from competitors. Additionally, pri-
vate sources of capital — though
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public sources — are growing,
which means that being private is a
less significant barrier to expan-
sion than before.
More intangible but with a
potentially greater payoff is the
effect going private has on agency
costs. Suddenly, the interests of
managers and owners are aligned
more than ever in a private structure.
Instead of gunning for short-term
gains that might in the long run hurt
shareholders (e.g. Enron,WorldCom),
managers of private firms are free 
to pursue whatever is best for the
company. (Going private is not neces-
sarily a new trend; the reduction of
agency costs was one of the reasons
behind the leveraged-buyout craze of
the 1980s, a movement led by players
like Kohlberg Kravis Roberts.)
Joseph Fuller, CEO of consulting firm
Monitor Group, wrote in a 2004 
article that obituaries for the public
company structure may be a bit pre-
mature. “Still,” he added, “the form 
is showing its age and vulnerability.” 
Sarbanes-Oxley has brought that
observation into clear focus: Firms 
are going private at a faster clip in 
the wake of the new law. In a 2004
paper, three University of Chicago
researchers added up 93 firms that
filed to go private in the 19 months
before Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted
and 142 going private in the 19 months
after (see table). Rachel Hayes, an
accounting professor and co-author of
the study, described that as a “modest
increase.” Hayes says it’s possible that
the increase is partly cyclical in nature,
but that her study mostly seems to
point to a combination of market 
conditions and the effect of Sarbanes-
Oxley as making “going private more
attractive.”
A Fifth District examination of
going-private transactions is, as with
the going-dark case, inconclusive
because of the small sample size. There
were seven going-private filings among
Fifth District firms in 2001, four in
2002, a small jump to seven in 2003,
and then six in 2004. North Carolina’s
Quintiles Transnational Corp., a drug-
testing company, served up one of
2003’s biggest going-private transac-
tions when a group led by the firm’s
chairman bought it out for about 
$1.7 billion. The complaint voiced 
in a Wilmington, N.C.-based Reeds
Jewelers Inc. announcement in early
2004 was representative of the going-
private mood: “Operating as a
privately held entity will enable Reeds
to reduce certain costs related to being
a public company, including, among
others, legal compliance costs.”
As with going-dark firms, a theme
with the recent spate of going-private
firms is their size: They’re small. After
the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, the
average size (by annual sales) of firms
going private was $74 million. And
that was less than half the size of the
typical firm going private before the
new law, when the average was 
$170 million in annual sales. (For 
comparison, consider that cracking
the Fortune 500 requires at least 
$3.6 billion in annual sales.)
Although Hayes is comfortable not-
ing the modest increase in going-private
transactions since Sarbanes-Oxley, she is
not so certain about drawing larger con-
clusions. “It’s so hard for us to look at
our data and say these guys would not
have gone private otherwise,” she says.
“It’s very possible a lot of these would
have gone private anyway.”
Never a Darling
Henry Funderburk is candid about the
very real possibility that his bank might
have gone private anyway. Darlington
County Bancshares, one of the smallest
banks in South Carolina, executed an
odd-lot tender offer that brought its
number of shareholders to 278,
spending about $175,000 to pur-
chase the stock of people owning
less than 100 shares.
Darlington Bank wasn’t even
listed on a stock exchange to begin
with. If a shareholder wanted to
sell some stock, bank management
would put them in touch with a
potential buyer, and vice versa, refer-
ring to a list kept at the bank’s only
office. But since it used to have more
than 300 shareholders, Darlington did
have to file the usual 10Ks and 10Qs
with the SEC. After Sarbanes-Oxley,
that meant spending money on a new
auditor to review controls that were
already reviewed by multiple bank
officers and regulators.
Banks are unlikely suspects for
stepped-up regulation. “The irony is
that these institutions were already
highly regulated, with records scruti-
nized by government officials as well
as their own auditors,” says law 
professor Carney in his paper “The
Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-
Oxley.” All that work reporting to
banking regulators is, unfortunately,
not entirely transferable to SEC
reporting requirements; everything
must be documented consistent with
Section 404’s unique standards.
Referring to a finding that 15 percent
of all going-private filers in 2004 were
banks, Carney says: “Surely investors
and depositors in these communities
will not feel better off because of these
developments … Say good-bye to the
community bank that was owned by
the community.”
Even though it’s now private,
Funderburk’s organization remains
subject to heavy regulatory scrutiny,
since it’s a bank. “We still have to com-
ply with everything,” he says. “We just
don’t have to do the reporting.” And
because of that, the bank figures to
save $100,000 a year in auditor fees.
That is a lot of money for
Darlington Bank, whose 2004 net
income was just $343,000.
Funderburk says Sarbanes-Oxley
“gave us a final push” but admits 
that going private was something the
Darlington County Bancshares, one of the
smallest banks in South Carolina, saw its
stock price struggle for years before direc-
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for years, anyway. Not even listed on a
stock exchange, what sort of benefits
was Darlington reaping from being
public?
As it happens, that’s the same ques-
tion directors at S&K Famous Brands
had been asking themselves for some
time. Karen Newman, an S&K direc-
tor and former dean of the business
school at University of Richmond, says
that when she took her seat on the
board in the spring of 2004, discus-
sions were already happening about
how to deal with S&K’s lifeless share
price. Sarbanes-Oxley, Newman says,
was “the straw that broke the camel’s
back.”
Whether going dark is merely a
stepping stone to going private or a
way station before returning to SEC
supervision depends as much on eco-
nomic conditions as it does on
Sarbanes-Oxley. CFO Knowles says
that returning to the Nasdaq might
very well be in S&K’s future.
For now, low interest rates make
bank debt more desirable than raising
capital through the equity markets, he
says. So long as S&K’s operations and
strategic growth can be funded
through loans, then there’s no rush 
to return to the Nasdaq. That said,
Knowles adds that any reforms by 
the SEC to make Section 404 less bur-
densome for smaller firms would
change that formula. “There’s no
question we would reconsider listing
if the small-firms issue was
addressed,” Knowles says. “I liked the
idea of being on the Nasdaq. It carried
a lot of clout.”
ASOXfor Small Firms?
Overwhelmed with complaints about
Section 404, the SEC has taken
notice. This spring, the commission
for the third time extended the dead-
line for smaller public firms to comply
with Section 404. And there is grow-
ing support, even among some
lawmakers, for softening Sarbanes-
Oxley rules when it comes to small
companies.
For the few hundred firms that go
dark to evade investor scrutiny,
“Sarbanes-Oxley has certainly not
served investors,” says Triantis, the
University of Maryland professor. But
he is not rushing to entirely dismiss
Sarbanes-Oxley as ineffective. Despite
the backlash, most firms are not 
straying from the public markets or
going dark.
Triantis says there are “hundreds
of firms that could deregister that
don’t and many more that have 300 or
more shareholders that could get
below that, so we’re not talking 
about thousands of companies.”
Additionally and even more persua-
sive, is an easily overlooked finding in
his study: The negative stock slides of
going-dark firms have been worse
since the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley
than before. To Triantis, that means
the market is placing a higher value on
disclosure, which by extension ought
to lift share prices for firms that
remain SEC-compliant.
Robert Litan, senior fellow in eco-
nomic studies at the Brookings
Institution, says that disentangling
the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley from
other concurrent developments is
difficult. Perhaps it did have the
effect of restoring investor confi-
dence in the markets, but then again
what about the role of the criminal
justice system, which responded
more aggressively than Litan had
expected? Or the clamping down of
the New York and Nasdaq stock
exchanges, beefing up requirements
for membership? Or mounting civil
lawsuits against alleged wayward
executives? “You could argue that the
deterrent effect of [those things]
alone could have accomplished all the
benefits being claimed to Sarbanes-
Oxley,” Litan says. “Much of this
might have happened without
Sarbanes-Oxley.”
Sarbanes-Oxley is, of course, named
after its sponsors: Sen. Paul Sarbanes, a
Maryland Democrat, and Rep. Michael
Oxley, an Ohio Republican. Many 
analysts and observers credit the pair’s
legislation with a renewed emphasis 
on good corporate governance that 
has restored integrity and trust in 
U.S. firms.
In a 2004 press release on the two-
year anniversary of Sarbanes-Oxley,
Sen. Sarbanes summed up the case for
the legislation that bears his name: 
“I believe that we have succeeded in
raising standards,” he said, “with
increasing international support, to
give investors a new degree of confi-
dence in our capital markets.” Still,
there are dissenters. Over at S&K
headquarters, CFO Knowles notes
that Sarbanes is retiring after his 
current term expires in 2006. It’s an
open question whether S&K stock 
can hold up that long in the dark. RF
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